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Trajectories of the Discourse 
on Transnational Organized Crime: 
Biopolitical Wars and Global Civil Society
Introduction
It is commonplace to claim that we live in conditions 
dominated by the deregulation of markets, of border-
less transactions, and faster communications, which in 
turn, have reduced the limits and constraints posed by 
space and time in human interactions. Paradoxically, at 
the same time, we witness, and in many cases experi-
ence ourselves, an expansion in the domains of securiti-
zation and control mechanisms at the level of the spac-
es that these transformations seem to have allowed to 
exist beyond the scope of the traditional territoriality 
of the nation-state. Given that the possibility to think 
about global challenges depends on a discursive ra-
tionalisation of political life, the main aim of this article is 
to understand how global relations and their dynamics 
are transformed into an object of governance through 
discursive practices—the means through which poli-
cies and forms of governance are constituted. 
In order to do this, I will trace the political discourse un-
derlying the deployment of apparatuses of governance 
developed around the domains of law enforcement, 
policing and security in face of the debates around the 
control of cross-border crimes. Insofar as these forms of 
crime escape the control of nation-states, it is around 
them that there has been a development of transna-
tional forms of policy response, which therefore express 
a crucial dimension of contemporary global govern-
ance. In particular, I will seek to disclose the principles 
that have played a central role in the constitution of a 
discourse on transnational organized crime, consider-
ing that it represents one of the most important issues 
for the contemporary governance of global relations.
The text is divided in three parts: the first part defines 
the analytical framework employed to analyse the dis-
course on organized crime from a Foucaultian point of 
view as part of power relations and forms of govern-
ance at the transnational level. There, I define biopower 
and transnational spaces. The second part examines 
the constitution of a discourse about crime defined as 
an alien threat to society, first as it was developed in the 
United States during the 1950s, and then as it reaches 
worldwide scope with the concept of transnational or-
ganized crime (TOC) in the last two decades. Finally, the 
conclusion of the article outlines the consequences of 
the discourse on transnational crime in the context of 
contemporary wars on global crime and terror. 
This article argues that the governance and policies 
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Abstract
The article aims to understand how the dominant conceptualization of transnational crime legitimates non-traditional 
forms of warfare at the global level while itself constituting the idea of global civil society. It is argued that since this dis-
course defines transnational crime as a threat to global society, it makes politically viable the deployment of policing and 
military interventions in defence of the world population. In order to expose this, this article reconstructs the trajectories 
of the discourse on organized criminality. The article first analyses the emergence of the discourse in the United States 
during the 1950s, afterwards analysing it as an issue of transnational scope during the last two decades. Thus the aim 
here is to underline the importance that a phenomenon such as crime has had on the governance at a global level.
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on crime control at the global level are framed within 
a discourse about organized crime, defining it as an 
internal threat of alien or external origin. Such defini-
tion legitimates the fight against organized crime and 
constitutes the idea of a global civil society in itself. 
Insofar as the discourse defines crime as an enemy to 
the world population, very much in the same way as 
traditional political enemies would be characterized, it 
allows for the deployment of an assemblage of policing 
and military interventions on a global scale. Thus, I con-
sider that, as criminality and crime control become an 
issue of transnational importance, the biopolitical ap-
proach allows us to understand how definitive they are 
for the constitution of a transnational governmentality 
of populations.
Conceptualizing Transnational 
Organized Crime 
Many authors have highlighted the importance of criti-
cally analysing the political grounds of the concept of 
transnational crime, not only because of its question-
able level of efficacy, but also because of its unclear 
normative stance (Sheptycki 2000b; Gill and Edwards 
2003; Beare 2003; Andreas and Nadelmann 2006). 
Though sharing this concern, the article approaches 
the issue from a particular perspective, starting from 
understanding the grid of governance, which develops 
based on such conceptualization. This requires answer-
ing questions such as: How has crime become an issue 
of transnational political action? How has this concep-
tualization of crime become politically possible? How 
has such conceptualization implied the development 
of a whole set of policies, programmes, techniques 
that affect the people of the world? Finally, how has 
the world population become a subject to governance 
through transnational law enforcement and policing? 
In answering these questions I seek to highlight the sig-
nificance that crime control measures have had in the 
emergence of forms of global governance, and there-
fore, in the transformations in political power and au-
thority in a globalised world. 
The consideration here is that in order to understand 
these changes in governance in recent times it is nec-
essary to disclose the historical trajectories of political 
problems that play a central role in the constitution of 
a global or transnational spatiality of governance. In the 
case of crime, there remains the fundamental task of 
reconstructing the political discourses that configure 
crime as a concern for the “world society”. This will allow 
for revealing the contingent and political character of 
the constitution of transnational spaces and the world 
population as objects of governance through the ac-
tive participation of political discourses (Foucault 1984: 
79). The intention here is to reconstruct the trajecto-
ries and contingent features underpinning the current 
state of affairs in global politics around the issue of or-
ganized crime through an engagement with the politi-
cal conceptualizations of the phenomenon, which has 
successfully imposed a dominant vision of the problem 
of the governance of crime at the global level. 
Whereas I share this objective with other constructiv-
ist approaches, to tackle adequately the question of 
governance at the global level, it is extremely useful 
to see it through Foucault’s insight. The particularity of 
governance in modern times is the emergence of the 
government of populations as a specific “art of gov-
ernment”, where political rationalities of government 
acquire this new way of thinking about the exercise of 
political power that emerged in the 18th century. It is 
characterized by an ensemble of institutions, proce-
dures, analyses and reflections, calculations and tactics 
that had as its target population, as its knowledge polit-
ical economy, and as its technical means apparatuses of 
security (Foucault 1991: 99-101; Dean 1999). Only in this 
context of governance populations become object of 
governance based on the knowledge of the emergent 
social sciences, statistics and demography, which pro-
vided a way of representing the autonomous dynamics 
of society to assess whether they should be subject to 
regulation (Foucault 2008: 20-2, 317; Barry et al 1996: 
9-10). 
This idea allows for recreating some important dimen-
sions that other approaches do not fully consider, in 
particular, it provides a key to understand how crime 
and the measures to control it may involve coercive 
and military interventions, and more importantly how 
can they be politically justified and extended beyond 
national borders. First of all, when discussing transna-
tional governance one should not only be looking at 
the concurrence or confrontation of state’s interests, 
the institutional frameworks of their interactions, or 
the values all these actors and institutions are imbued 
with. One should consider these elements within the 
configuration given by rationalities or grids of intel-
ligibility (govern-mentalities as he calls them) that are 
developed to govern problems that are beyond states 
and involve as their main object the population of the 
world.
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Secondly, it makes clear that, as Foucault shows, all the 
set of regulations, controls, and interventions that stem 
from this particular art of government in modernity 
need to appeal to, and operate through the idea of the 
protection and care of the health of populations, and 
therefore through a variety of actions aimed at the po-
litical administration of the life of populations. Whereas 
political power in the classical view of the term is as-
sociated only with the sovereign imposition of mili-
tary power in a given territory, through the biopolitical 
approach one can see how this same modern politi-
cal power may combine such military measures with 
a whole different set of mechanisms not only to con-
front political enemies, but also to deal with a variety 
of threats that put into risk the “normal development” 
of populations. This disposition of the art of govern-
ment in modernity is what here constitutes biopolitics; 
a way of approaching the question of government and 
power that starts from the way power is exercised over 
the body politic, through its subjects, and by means of 
security apparatuses (Foucault 2004: 249-50).
Biopolitical Threats 
How is it possible for law enforcement measures and 
policies against crime to become part of the deploy-
ment of strategies for the government of populations 
that imply warfare and military actions within and 
even against the populations they aim to protect? In 
the name of what, and according to what rules could 
population be put into risk, and be object of security 
strategies in the context of biopolitics (Foucault 2008: 
317-23)? Being also a substantial part of this analysis, 
Foucault’s answer is that “it is at this point that racism 
intervenes. It is at this moment that racism is inscribed 
as the basic mechanism of power, as it is exercised in 
modern States”. One should be careful, however, when 
drawing on this idea of racism in modern politics, and 
understand how this discourse on racism is not limited 
to the hate between races, but that actually:
it is a way of fragmenting the field of the biologi-
cal that power controls. It is a way of separating 
out the groups that exist within a population ... 
This will allow power to treat the population as a 
mixture of races, or to be more accurate, to sub-
divide the species it controls ... That is the first 
function of racism: to fragment, to create caesu-
ras within the biological continuum addressed 
by biopower (Foucault 2004: 255). 
Thus, it must be noted that in this discourse “the en-
emies who have to be done away with are not adver-
saries in the political sense of the term; they are threats, 
either external or internal, to the population and for the 
population”. In the biopower system, “the imperative to 
kill is acceptable only if it results not in a victory over 
political adversaries, but in the elimination of the bio-
logical threat to the improvement of the species and 
race” (Foucault 2004: 255). 
As Foucault (2004: 257) says, “the same could be said 
of criminality. Once the mechanism of biocriminal was 
called upon to make it possible to execute or ban-
ish criminals, criminality was conceptualized in racist 
terms”. Crime becomes one of these threats: along with 
an assemblage of powers it is possible to put into work, 
the classical sovereign mechanisms to kill the enemies, 
and the biopolitical mechanisms to enhance the life 
of populations. Through the establishment of a racist 
discourse, or better expressed perhaps, through a dis-
course that claims to defend the society, the classical 
view of war against enemies is made compatible with 
the exercise of biopower in modern societies in a dif-
ferent form of war against threats as diffuse as those of 
drug trafficking and organized criminality, or any other 
issue, which may be considered a threat to the prosper-
ous growth of society (Foucault 2004: 255-6).
Secondly, alongside this division within the population 
there is a broader and more fundamental consequence 
of this discourse for the defence of society. As Fou-
cault (2004: 18) concludes, “this kind of representation 
of the enemy, of a binary schema of war and struggle 
and clash between forces, is the one that can be really 
identified as the basis for the creation of a civil society, 
as both the principle and the motor of the exercise of 
political power, and of the analysis of political power 
as war”. By naming and defining the threat/enemy the 
society performs a fundamental movement that allows 
for the definition of political frontiers. It performs the 
“introduction of a break into the domain of life that is 
under power’s control: the break between what must 
live and what must die”, shaping in this way the con-
tours of “civil society” itself, in a way, inexistent up to this 
point (Foucault 2004: 155). Here, clearly, just as racism 
does not strictly mean hate for other races, death is not 
understood only as murder. Death, in the context of bi-
opower, “refers to every form of indirect murder, includ-
ing, of course, political death, expulsion, rejection, and 
so on” (Foucault 2004: 256). In the context of biopolitics, 
the broader political consequence of the establishment 
of a threat such as organized crime is the introduction 
Interdisciplinary Political Studies
Vol.2, No. 1 Special issue, March 2012
©IdPS
27
ISSN 2039-8573 online
of a division within society itself. This division consti-
tutes the frontiers of what becomes civil society and at 
the same time of those threats that constitute its main 
security concern, which serves to define those con-
demned to political death.
Transnational Spaces and 
Security Considerations 
There is, finally, a particular emphasis given to govern-
ance in modernity, to the modalities of power, and au-
thority in the international system. Intensification of 
transnational processes—often conceptualized as glo-
balisation—pushes Foucault “outside” the nation-state, 
i.e. as he was already working power “beyond” the state, 
and however “within” the nation-state itself as space of 
reflection”. With the study of this problematic the pur-
pose is to be more historical and look at the specific 
issues—transnational crime—that have allowed the 
questions of transnational and global governance to 
come into existence as a particular technology of rule, 
part of a longer trajectory in the history of modern po-
litical governance (Larner and Walters 2004: 4). Accord-
ingly, transnational will be used in this article as a label 
for the study of the ways in which a political reflection 
and discursive enunciation around the governance and 
management of populations in these spaces within, 
above, beyond, between and across nation-states ap-
pears. The nature of this space should not be assumed 
in advance, but via an examination of heterogeneous 
discourses and practices, in terms of which power is ex-
ercised beyond the nation-state. Transnational may re-
fer to the bilateral, regional, international, supranational, 
and in some specific circumstances, the global. Trans-
national governance is understood as a particular form 
of political imagination for the government of popula-
tions. It is in this sense that I intend to reconstruct the 
discourses that justify the exercise of power and gov-
ernment operating beyond the state for the control of 
crime (Larner and Walters 2004: 16).
This genealogical reconstruction will serve to make 
evident the contingent character of the problems and 
moments of crises—including the problem of transna-
tional crime—that have started as local issues and be-
come transnational questions of governance, support-
ing the emergence of a political discourse. The latter is 
specifically conceived to regulate, control and exercise 
forms of power not only from, between, and over states, 
but more importantly, over and through the territories 
and populations living within these transnational spac-
es (Larner and Walters 2004: 4). Such disclosure aims to 
give a means to question current practices of govern-
ment and reflect on their legitimacy and scope, and 
most importantly, to realise that things could be seen, 
defined, and governed differently. 
Internal Threats 
vs. External Enemies
 
To understand the constitution of transnational crime 
as a biopolitical threat, it is fundamental to reconstruct 
the constitution of a field of truth in relation to the chal-
lenge of organized crime in the United States.1  Many 
criminologists and researchers on the history of or-
ganized crime have shown that without the American 
conceptualization of it, as well as its efforts to expand it 
globally, there would not have been the development 
of apparatuses of security and law enforcement in the 
particular way it was constituted during the 1990s 
around the world (Nadelmann 1990, 1993; Woodiwiss 
2001, 2003a, 2003b; Edwards and Gill 2002; Andreas 
and Nadelmann 2006).
The Discourse on Organized Crime 
and Security 
The seminal conception about organized crime was es-
tablished in its original form in the 1950s by criminolo-
gist Donald Cressey, who described organized crime as 
“a well-knitted, hierarchical and centralized organiza-
tion acting as an international conspiracy, seeking prof-
it and power, and bound together by ethnic or some 
other form of cultural kinship” (Cressey 1969: x). This pic-
ture of organized crime regards it as the activity of hi-
erarchically structured, often culturally-bound groups, 
who collaborate for prolonged periods of time and 
1 I focus my attention in the US only because the Ameri-
can construction of the problem of crime and of its necessity to 
be addressed transnationally is the most accepted internationally, 
and not because I believe we are experiencing a process of impe-
rial imposition upon the world by coercive or other means. Even 
when I would not deny altogether that this “real” forces and inter-
ests might be part of the successful dissemination of the American 
interpretation, I believe that paying too much attention to them 
misses out on the key variables to understand the ways of politi-
cally defining the threats to populations at the transnational level 
that I wish to highlight. I am also aware that other actors such as 
the United Nation and the European Union have been part of the 
process of the definition of transnational crime, and surely they 
cannot be underestimated. Yet, their role has been in many ways 
shaped in their relation to the American discourse, that amounts 
to the hegemonic view on organized crime and which in the end 
justifies giving it most of our attention.
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whose reckless and sometimes violent pursuit of profit 
and political power threatens the “respectable society” 
from within and outside at the same time (Edwards and 
Gill 2003: 268). This conception, where organized crime 
appears as an alien threatening conspiracy against the 
American society, became the dominant official repre-
sentation governing criminal policies and popular im-
aginary since the findings of the Kefauver Committee, 
the first nationwide investigation on the Mafia syndi-
cate undergone in the United States, and which was in 
charge of investigating organized crime in 1951 (Kefau-
ver Committee 1951). 
More importantly, this conception was echoed in two 
other historically crucial Commissions for the study of 
organized crime and law enforcement in the United 
States. Deemed at the time to be “the most compre-
hensive study of crime and criminal justice undertaken 
in the Nation’s history” (Winslow 1967: iii), the 1967 Pres-
ident’s Commission Report of Law and Administration 
of Justice The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society ex-
plicitly quoted the Kefauver Committee to give its defi-
nition of organized crime (Winslow, 1967: 191). Thirty 
five years later, in 1986, the Reagan’s Commission on 
Organized Crime used it in the second nationwide in-
quiry for the investigation of Organized Crime after the 
Kefauver Committee (Kaufmann 1986: 25). Certainly, it 
is remarkable that despite some obvious differences of 
context because of the transformations experienced 
between these reports, the general understanding of 
organized crime remained attached to Cressey’s defini-
tion of an alien threat to society, giving support to the 
specific law enforcement strategies applied against or-
ganized crime ever since (Smith 1991; Albini 1997; Nay-
lor 1995; Levi 1998; Woodiwiss 2001, 2003b).
Other researchers have already underlined this remark-
able continuity in the conceptualization of organized 
crime. However, it should be highlighted how such rep-
resentation has gradually emerged through official and 
academic research on organized crime and has suc-
cessfully captured popular imaginaries and works not 
only as a typical discourse for the definition of a bio-
political threat but also as a discourse for the defence 
of society. Finally it should be shown how in the end 
crime becomes an issue of concern necessitating mili-
tary responses going beyond the national framework 
of action. 
 This conception allows for the construction of 
discourses stating that, whether people face it daily or 
not, there is a threat originating from organizational 
structures with power and wealth of a degree strong 
enough to challenge the basic structures of society. It 
places the existence of this not rightly evident but pow-
erful enemy as an incontrovertible fact that requires 
urgent measures in order to protect society. These are 
“alien-enemies” operating in the form of powerful or-
ganizations within society itself, closely tied with exte-
rior forces and interests. It should be made clear that a 
danger exists, that it comes from external forces, and 
the very fact that it has been ignored for so long is part 
of the problem itself. 
A clear example of this discursive formation appears in 
Senator Robert F. Kennedy’s book from 1960 The En-
emy Within, and in his statements in the Hearings be-
fore the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of 
the Senate Committee on Governmental Operations, 
where he affirmed that: “The American public may not 
see him, but that makes the racketeer’s power for evil 
in our society even greater. Lacking the direct confron-
tation with the racketeer, the American citizen fails to 
see the reason for alarm. The reason, decidedly, exists” 
(Quoted in Kelly 1999: i; Simon 2007; Kennedy 1994). 
Some twenty years later President Reagan reiterated 
this view stating that: 
Down deep, the American people know a criminal con-
federation exists in our country, that it has incredible 
power.... What kind of people are we if we continue to 
tolerate in our midst an invisible, lawless empire? Can 
we honestly say that America is the land with justice for 
all if we do not now exert every effort to eliminate this 
confederation of professional criminals, this dark, evil 
enemy within? (Reagan 1986)
Secondly, it is important to identify how this concep-
tion of organized crime allows for the deployment of 
security apparatuses for its control within the popula-
tion itself. As it was argued above, discourses on the 
defence of society not only define threats against the 
population, but they also perform the important func-
tion of dividing it internally, and use the discourse of 
war and confrontation to define the frontiers that pro-
vide with the identity of “civil society” in face of a rec-
ognized threat. The establishment of the existence of 
these huge corporations of crime as a threat to society 
draws this frontier between the outlaw, opportunistic 
and corrupted alien groups in opposition to the law-
abiding respectable society. In this case, it is affirmed by 
this discourse about organized crime that the existence 
of organized crime is not an intrinsic consequence of 
the American style of life, but, quite on the contrary, but 
of the danger of crime that lies in its impulse to infil-
trate, corrupt and control it from outside. In this rep-
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resentation, crime remains external to society. It is not 
the product of this respectable society. This is the exact 
meaning of an enemy within society which is, however, 
alien to the productive machinery of the American so-
cial fabric, and that can even destroy it through its ruth-
less, violent, and reckless behaviour. 
This could not be more clearly stated than by the influ-
ential definition presented by the Kefauver Committee 
in its Third Interim Report: 
There is a nationwide syndicate known as the 
Mafia, whose tentacles are found in many large 
cities. It has international ramifications which ap-
pear most clearly in connection with the narcot-
ics traffic (...) leadership appears to be in a group 
rather than in a single individual (...). The Mafia is 
a secret conspiracy against law and order which 
will ruthlessly eliminate anyone who betrays its 
secrets (Kefauver Committee 1951: 147-50).
Essentially, the problem of organized crime was some-
thing society needed to be made aware of, needed to 
take responsibility in preventing, but something soci-
ety was not causing itself. As Woodiwiss argues, it was 
considered unpatriotic to challenge the integrity of the 
American political and economic systems, and for that 
reason “any organized criminality had to have come 
from foreign parts, in the form of an all-encompassing 
evil emanating from abroad capable of threatening 
from “outside” the social fabric built by the respectable 
society. They are a “threat” to, rather than part of, this 
society” (Woodiwiss 2003b: 18). It is only within the 
context of this discourse that the war against crime was 
able to be conceived, a war that was, therefore, not to 
be fought through questioning of the individualist and 
neo-conservative society that Regan was promulgating 
back then, but one that targeted its enemies “outside” 
the American social fabric.
The Problem of Drug Tra!cking: 
Going Beyond the Nation-State
To understand how crime started to be thought as a 
problem that goes beyond any nation, there is another 
aspect, intrinsically related to the external character 
of the threat of organized crime: the place that drug 
trafficking acquired within this discursive field. Drug 
trafficking became one of the most important nodal 
points, insofar as it appeared as the missing link to ex-
plain the transformation and strengthening of organ-
ized criminality into huge enterprises of crime of world-
wide scope. In this case, as soon as crimes related to 
drug trade are defined as a threat to society from in-
ternational syndicates of drug traffickers, they turn the 
analysis of political action to a problem beyond the 
nation-state territoriality, making possible to politically 
conceive the War on Drugs. 
 The first to declare the War on Drugs President 
Nixon defined the threat precisely in the form of a bi-
opolitical discourse to defend society in order to acti-
vate the mechanisms of war against crime beyond the 
American territory:
America has the largest number of heroin ad-
dicts of any nation in the world. And yet, Ameri-
ca does not grow opium-of which heroin is a de-
rivative—nor does it manufacture heroin, which 
is a laboratory process carried out abroad. This 
deadly poison in the American life stream is, in 
other words, a foreign import ... No serious at-
tack on our national drug problem can ignore 
the international implications of such an effort, 
nor can the domestic effort succeed without at-
tacking the problem on an international plane ... 
To wage an effective war against heroin addic-
tion, we must have international cooperation .... 
I consider the heroin addiction of American citi-
zens an international problem of grave concern 
to this Nation, and I instructed our Ambassadors 
to make this clear to their host governments ... 
The foregoing proposals establish a new and 
needed dimension in the international effort 
to halt drug production, drug traffic, and drug 
abuse (Nixon 1971).
Another equally fundamental feature in the insertion 
of the drug problem in this conception of organized 
crime was the extension or, as Potter (1994) has called 
it, the “pluralisation” of the alien character of organized 
crime during the 1970s and more definitively during the 
1980s. Whereas the 1951 Kefauver findings were strictly 
drawn from the Italian mafia experience, by 1986 the 
Kaufman Commission claimed that due to practices 
such as drug trafficking the mafia had been challenged 
by crime cartels from other cultural groups and gangs 
such as the Mexicans, Chinese, Vietnamese, Japanese, 
Cuban, Colombians, Irish, and Canadians. As it is wide-
ly known, President Reagan declared his war against 
drugs along the same lines of Nixon, stating that: 
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This is the face of organized crime in America 
in the 1980s; far more encompassing and wide-
reaching than in the past, but in its essential 
characteristics not all that different from the face 
of organized crime a generation or two ago (...). 
In fact, by the late 1970s, the old and new groups 
were setting up close and expanding ties (...). 
As threatening as the drug trade, for example, 
were those new varieties of organized criminal 
groups: motorcycle and prison gangs, and Asian 
or Colombian drug gangs” (Reagan 1986).
 
It was then, with the Kaufman Commission, that this 
pluralisation of the alien threat thesis took place in 
order to include new ethnic, immigrant and cultural 
groups within the United States (Potter 1994: 7). These 
discourses help to recognise the centrality of the War 
on Drugs for the governance of transnational relations, 
as it becomes one the most important wars in con-
temporary times, in which the biopolitical mechanisms 
for the governance of crime and criminals have been 
applied through apparatuses of crime control beyond 
the territory of the nation-state. In this way, traditionally 
related to security and diplomatic techniques in inter-
state relations and therefore not commonly referred 
to issues related to crime, the military machinery ap-
pears as a fundamental tool for combating crime in the 
international arena. As long as these are enemies and 
threats to society, they are fought through wars; they 
license the conjunction of the sovereign power to kill 
with the exercise of biopower for the control of popula-
tions and their dynamics to live. 
We just need to quote Reagan again in its Radio Ad-
dress to the Nation on Economic Growth and the War 
on Drugs:  
The bill that has passed the House provides for 
the death penalty for these vicious killers. We 
must, we need, and we will, have this law. Now, 
there are those who have opposed the House 
bill because it includes the death penalty. Oth-
ers oppose it because of the “good-faith” excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule. I believe these peo-
ple are more concerned with the abstract rights 
of criminals than the right of our society to save 
itself from those in this country and outside who 
seek their fortune in our national misfortune 
(Reagan 1988).
Organized crime is identified with these highly organ-
ized groups, not only of Italians, but also groups with 
other cultural origins acting as “cartels” with links all over 
the world due to the proliferation of drug trade as a 
huge business of transnational scope. Those involved in 
the supply chain are identified here as cartels organized 
in the form of reckless international enterprises conspir-
ing against the prosperity of the world society. In this 
way, the alien character of organized crime constitutes 
the enemies, but this time, crucially, beyond the Ameri-
can territory. This is the point at which, thanks to this 
analysis of drug trade, the biopolitics of the transnation-
al arena exercises its government of crime through war 
relations in the War on Drugs. It is in this context where 
the character of threat in biopolitics can be defined as 
that which is in need of an intervention beyond the 
borders of a nation-state. 
President Bush drew this picture very clearly at the end 
of the 1980s presenting the United Nations Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics and Psychotropic Sub-
stances to the Senate: 
The production, trafficking, and consumption of 
illicit narcotics have become a worldwide men-
ace of unprecedented proportions. Narcotics 
trafficking and abuse threaten the developing 
and industrialized nations alike, eroding fragile 
economies, endangering democratic institu-
tions, and affecting the health and well-being 
of people everywhere. The profits made from 
the international drug trade are consolidated in 
the hands of powerful drug lords who operate 
with impunity outside the law. The widespread 
corruption, violence, and human destruction as-
sociated with the drug problem imperil all na-
tions and can only be suppressed if all nations 
cooperate effectively in bringing to justice those 
who engage in illicit trafficking and abuse (Bush 
1989a).
Thus defined, the political problematisation of drug traf-
ficking becomes one of the most important elements 
to understand how crime may eventually be defined as 
a central issue in the constitution of the governance of 
transnational spaces, in particular to see how even be-
fore the end of the Cold War, many mechanisms of gov-
ernance started to be thought beyond or outside the 
previously established ideological-political framework 
established. With the War on Drugs it becomes clear 
that the issues that developed forms of transnational 
political action after the Cold War had been established 
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before its end. In addition, the configuration of the Cold 
War in this manner can articulate military measures that 
need not to be ideologically or politically framed in the 
Cold War era sense of these terms. 
This historical trajectory perhaps matters most when 
such diagnosis about drug trafficking and organized 
crime is also embraced by the United Nations through 
signing of the Convention Against Transnational Or-
ganized Crime in 2000 (United Nations, 2000). But how 
did we arrive to that point? 
Transnational Crime and the 
Defence of the Global Civil Society
By the beginning of the 1990s, a very important trans-
formation had happened in the international commu-
nity. The end of the Cold War brought about a complex 
political scenario comparable to what Foucault defines 
as a crisis on the rationality of governance (Foucault 
2008: 68). The instable equilibrium of forces inherent to 
the Cold War allowing the deployment of a variety of 
controls at the international level from the two main 
powers fades away, and many questions in terms of the 
governance of these spaces arise. How would it be pos-
sible to make acceptable a whole set of regulations on 
the conduct of people, when it is precisely freedom of 
movement, transactions, negotiations, and all the im-
aginable things involved in the production of society, 
the most valuable thing western societies defend—i.e. 
when freedom is situated at the very base of the society 
that had been defended against the communist world?
A set of practices such as trade, migration, communi-
cations enter in a dynamic of deregulation due to the 
liberalization that this new context brought about. 
However, a parallel concern about the contingency and 
possible consequences of the random articulations of 
those practices emerges. Sovereign or state-centred 
discourses for intervention and control used until this 
point in time in the international arena became less 
suitable to face the challenges posed by this trans-
formed scenario.
It is in this discursive and political context that by 1995 
United States President Bill Clinton dedicates its speech 
at the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations to de-
clare action against the transnational dimensions of the 
problem of organized crime such as drug trafficking 
and money laundering. The speech, not very common 
for a UN forum, emphasized the importance of tackling 
international organized crime in order to promote the 
safety of the world’s citizens (Shepticky 2000b: 154). 
Indeed, drawing on the successful example of the drug 
war during the 1980s, crime was defined as a transna-
tional phenomenon where, due to economic and social 
liberalization transnational organizations of crime were 
operating at a global level as a diffuse enemy threat-
ening from within the security of the global society. 
A whole field of knowledge and discourse appeared 
to recreate official and popular imaginaries of organ-
ized crime evolving into a picture where the degree of 
global mafia cooperation had grown to the extent that 
criminal organizations were now a well-integrated and 
coherent network with a strong capacity to achieve 
degrees of domination at the global level (Naylor 1995; 
Andreas and Price 2001).
The American representation of organized crime as a 
threat was restated, re-established and updated, and 
TOC became a “threat” very much in the way of an alien-
enemy within society. However, this time the export of 
this conception beyond its use in US domestic criminal 
justice to the international arena implied that the en-
emy was operating within and against the global soci-
ety, thus giving way to the constitution of a biopolitics 
of criminal control in the transnational arena. Let us see 
it in the words of President Clinton:
Today, the threat to our security is not in an en-
emy silo but in the briefcase or the car bomb 
of a terrorist. Our enemies are also international 
criminals and drug traffickers who threaten the 
stability of new democracies and the future of 
our children… So, my friends, in this increasingly 
interdependent world, we have more common 
opportunities and more common enemies than 
ever before. It is, therefore, in our interest to face 
them together as partners, sharing the burdens 
and costs and increasing our chances of success 
(Clinton 1995).
 
In a matter of years, TOC emerged as a new object of 
transnational governance epitomizing the transforma-
tion on mechanisms of biopolitics at the global level. 
This new global pluralist theory of threats had the 
singularity for the whole modern conception of inter-
national relations of pointing as its target to criminals 
rather than to political enemies, orientating definitively 
apparatuses of security in the international arena to-
ward the governance of crime rather than to military 
enemies (Edwards and Gill 2002: 245). 
Furthermore, this discourse has also the important per-
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formative implication of drawing a new global political 
frontier to constitute a global society fighting against 
global crime. As argued above, with the definition of 
organized crime as an alien enemy threatening the 
global civil society, simultaneously, the drawing of the 
frontiers of a world society took place.
The clearest development of this instance was Kofi An-
nan’s thesis that with globalization we also witnessed 
the emergence of an uncivil society, expression used by 
him to refer to the terrorists, criminals, drug dealers, traf-
fickers of people and others who undo the good works 
of the global civil society. This thesis is a great expres-
sion of the enormous transformations in the interna-
tional arena after the end of the Cold War, since it places 
TOC at the centre of the threats to an international civil 
society—impossible to conceive in the previously di-
vided world—defining thereby the shared foundations 
of progress, tolerance, pluralism and respect of the con-
temporary world society (Annan 1997). Transnational 
criminality was defined as those ruthless structures un-
doing the good works of this society, taking advantage 
of its developments and the benefits it had brought to 
the world (Massari 2003: 60-6). 
This discourse presents TOC as a shared enemy, a 
shared responsibility of every government that aligns 
with the objectives of this prosperous world civil socie-
ty, its dominant culture and universally accepted ethos. 
This was the constitution of a division within the popu-
lation of the world that allows for the activation of the 
paradox of biopower that, in order to protect life, must 
at the same time wage war against the population it 
protects, and in the case of this global civil society, be-
tween those that are welcome to enjoy all the oppor-
tunities it creates and benefits it brings, and those who 
are to be excluded and condemned to political death 
to preserve it. Its worldwide concretion would finally 
come a few years later, in November 2000, when the 
United Nations General Assembly adopted the UN Con-
vention against Transnational Organized Crime, follow-
ing in many ways the footsteps and advancement in 
the American domestic context.2 
“Wars” on Drugs and Terror 
The imperative to kill in biopolitics is acceptable only if 
it results not in a victory over political adversaries, but 
in the elimination of the biological threats to the pop-
2 For a reconstruction of the UN trajectories, albeit from a 
very different perspective from the one developed here see: Wil-
liams and Savona (1996); Williams and Vlassis (2001); Vlassis (2002).
ulation, which of course includes forms of criminality. 
There is substantial historical evidence in recent years 
to sustain the claim that the move towards an intelli-
gence-led policing has also meant the more extensive 
use of military and intelligence hardware, personnel, 
and strategies for law enforcement tasks, as well as the 
rising status of policing issues in diplomacy and secu-
rity discourses (cf. Andreas and Nadelmann 2006; Hag-
gerty and Ericson 1997; 2000; Sheptycki 2000a).
Only as an example, Beare shows how the blurring of 
the frontier that separates national security from crimi-
nal intelligence cannot be understood without the 
recent articulation made between the threats of crimi-
nal organizations, money laundering activities, drug 
trafficking, and those posed by terrorist groups (Beare 
2003: xvii). It is evident that war techniques and strat-
egies acquire great political prominence when drug 
trafficking in addition to other illegal forms of financ-
ing political violence, are linked to the phenomenon 
of terrorism under headings such as narco-terrorism. 
In the last decades, activities such as drug trafficking 
and money laundering have provided the missing link 
between terrorism and organized crime allowing this 
assemblage between crime control–law enforcement 
strategies with military techniques against political en-
emies.
For this reason, it is now commonplace that more atypi-
cal enterprises of war such as those against drugs and 
terror will involve as much policing and law enforce-
ment techniques as conventional soldiering and strate-
gies to wage war. Indeed, the paradoxical exercise of 
forms biopower through crime control measures oper-
ating with techniques of war in so many fields normally 
competence of law enforcement authorities, and vice 
versa, has become even more explicit in the “age of ter-
ror”. 
For now, this reconstruction of the emergence of the 
problem of crime as part of the constitution of the gov-
ernance of transnational spaces in a world marked by 
deregulations of borders, serves us to reaffirm what 
Foucault said in terms of the interplay in liberalism be-
tween freedom and apparatuses of security: “The prob-
lems of what I shall call the economy of power peculiar 
to liberalism are internally sustained, as it were, by this 
interplay of freedom and security” (Foucault 2008: 65). 
In the context of liberalism and biopolitics “the horse-
men of the Apocalypse disappear and in their place 
everyday dangers appear, emerge, and spread every-
where ... there is no liberalism without a culture of dan-
ger” (Foucault 2008: 67). 
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This, in turn, draws attention to what Michael Dillon and 
other commentators have interpreted as the assem-
blage between forms of actuarial and self-regulatory 
technologies with those of despotic rule and coercive 
sovereign power, that is to say, between the biopower 
of fostering and preserving life, and the sovereign pow-
er to kill (Dillon and Neal 2008; Reid 2008; Dillon 2009; 
Dillon and Reid 2009). This is the constitution of what 
I would call the transnational police-law enforcement/
military-security assemblage that in many fields has 
displaced the classic and modern military-diplomatic 
apparatus that used to regulate the relations between 
states and guarantee the establishment of the equilib-
rium and security of the international arena. It is evident 
that more research should follow these specific discur-
sive configurations after the 9/11, but most of all, the 
specific practical policies, programmes, apparatuses 
and mechanisms developed through these global ra-
tionalities of governance in order to increase knowl-
edge about the international public policies developed 
for tackling organized crime as a consequence of these 
political discourses.
As this would take us a bit far off the principal focus of 
this analysis, and in fact, would deserve a complete dif-
ferent analysis in itself about the place that neoliberal-
ism as a rationality of government has in all these gov-
ernment of the transnational, I will conclude by saying 
that it remains fundamental, and it has been the central 
concern throughout this analysis, to restore the histori-
cal role that discourses on biopolitical criminal threats 
such as drug trafficking and transnational crime play 
in the constitution of this global apparatus of policing. 
Moreover, as it has become a mighty machine for the 
exercise of forms of political power in the global society 
since the 9/11. 
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